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COVID-19 has spread quickly through immigration detention facilities in the United States.
As of December 2, 2020, there have been over 7,500 conﬁrmed COVID-19 cases among
detained noncitizens. This Article examines why COVID-19 spread rapidly in immigration
detention facilities, how it has transformed detention and deportation proceedings, and
what can be done to improve the situation for detained noncitizens. Part I identiﬁes key
factors that contributed to the rapid spread of COVID-19 in immigration detention. While
these factors are not an exhaustive list, they highlight important weaknesses in the
immigration detention system. Part II then examines how the pandemic changed the
size of the population in detention, the length of detention, and the nature of removal
proceedings. In Part III, the Article offers recommendations for mitigating the impact of
COVID-19 on detained noncitizens. These recommendations include using more
alternatives to detention, curtailing transfers between detention facilities, establishing a
better tracking system for medically vulnerable detainees, prioritizing bond hearings and
habeas petitions, and including immigration detainees among the groups to be offered
COVID-19 vaccine in the initial phase of the vaccination program. The lessons learned from
the spread of COVID-19 in immigration detention will hopefully lead to a better response to
any future pandemics. In discussing these issues, the Article draws on national data from
January 2019 through November 2020 published by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), two agencies within
DHS. The main datasets used are detention statistics published by ICE for FY 2019
(Oct. 2018-Sep. 2019), FY 2020 (Oct. 2019-Sep. 2020), and the ﬁrst two months of FY
2021 (Oct. 2020-Nov. 2020). These datasets include detention statistics about individuals
arrested by ICE in the interior of the country, as well as by CBP at or near the border.
Additionally, the Article draws on separate data published by CBP regarding the total
number of apprehensions at the border based on its immigration authority under Title 8 of
the United States Code, as well as the number of expulsions at the border based on its
public health authority under Title 42 of the United States Code.
Keywords: immigration, migration, detention, removal, deportation, incarceration, asylum, COVID-19

INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has spread quickly through immigration detention facilities in the United States. As of
December 2, 2020, there have been over 7,500 conﬁrmed COVID-19 cases among detained
noncitizens (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020a). The purpose of immigration
detention is supposed to be to secure attendance at immigration court hearings and ensure the
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border. Additionally, the Article draws on completely separate
data published by CBP regarding the total number of
apprehensions at the border based on its immigration
authority under Title 8 of the United States Code, as well as
the total number of expulsions at the border based on its public
health authority under Title 42 of the United States Code. Some,
but not all, of the individuals apprehended by CBP are transferred
to ICE custody and detained. For example, unaccompanied
minors apprehended by CBP are never transferred to ICE
custody. Instead, they are transferred to the custody of the
Ofﬁce of Refugee Resettlement within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, which operates shelters that are not
considered detention.
Part I identiﬁes key factors that contributed to the rapid spread
of COVID-19 in immigration detention. While these factors are
not an exhaustive list, they highlight important weaknesses in the
immigration detention system. Part II then examines how the
pandemic changed the size of the population in detention, the
length of detention, and the nature of removal proceedings. In
Part III, the Article offers recommendations for mitigating the
impact of COVID-19 on detained noncitizens. These
recommendations include using more alternatives to detention,
curtailing transfers between detention facilities, establishing a
better tracking system for medically vulnerable detainees,
prioritizing bond hearings and habeas petitions, and including
immigration detainees among the groups to be offered COVID19 vaccine in the initial phase of the vaccination program. The
lessons learned from the spread of COVID-19 in immigration
detention will hopefully lead to a better response to any future
pandemics.

safety of the community. In reality, however, widespread
detention is used as a way to deter asylum seekers and other
migrants from coming to the United States (Ryo, 2019a).
Although the United States immigration detention system is
considered civil, it is embedded in the criminal justice system
and virtually indistinguishable from criminal punishment
(Stumpf, 2006; García Hernández, 2014; Ryo, 2019b). Like
prisoners, immigration detainees live in crowded conditions,
often with poor hygiene and inadequate ventilation, making
them especially vulnerable to contagious diseases (Meyer et al.,
2020).
The high rate of turnover in the detained population
contributes to the risk of infection (Solis et al., 2020). In FY
2020, the average daily population in United States immigration
detention was 34,427, but the total number of people booked into
immigration detention was 177,391 (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020b). Frequent transfers of noncitizens between
detention facilities further compounds the risk of transmission
(Human Rights Watch, 2011; Ryo and Peacock, 2018). In fact, in
August 2019, when the Centers for disease Control (“CDC”)
addressed outbreaks of the mumps in ﬁfteen immigration
detention centers across seven states, the agency speciﬁcally
noted concerns about “new introductions [of mumps cases]
into detention facilities through detainees who are transferred
or exposed before being taken into custody” (Leung et al., 2019).
Making matters worse, the immigration detention system is
plagued by “substandard and dangerous medical practices,”
including “overreliance on unqualiﬁed medical staff, delays in
emergency care, and requests for care unreasonably delayed”
(Human Rights Watch, 2017). Problems with medical care in
immigration detention have been documented for decades, and
the months leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic were no
exception. In June 2019, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Ofﬁce of the Inspector General found “egregious
violations” of ICE’s own detention standards, including poor
hygiene and inadequate medical care (Department of Homeland
Security, Ofﬁce of the Inspector General, 2019). Congress opened
an investigation into the medical care in immigration detention
facilities in December 2019, just a month before the ﬁrst
conﬁrmed coronavirus cases in the United States (Aleaziz, 2019).
These conditions alone have made it difﬁcult for DHS to
protect the health of noncitizens in custody. But DHS’s slow
response after the World Health Organization (WHO)
announced a global pandemic in March 2020 exacerbated the
situation. This Article examines why COVID-19 spread rapidly in
immigration detention facilities, how it has transformed
detention and deportation proceedings, and what can be done
to improve the situation for detained noncitizens.
In discussing these issues, the Article draws on national data
from January 2019 through November 2020 published by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), two agencies within DHS. The
main datasets used are detention statistics published by ICE for
FY 2019 (Oct. 2018-Sep. 2019), FY 2020 (Oct. 2019-Sep. 2020),
and the ﬁrst two months of FY 2021 (Oct. 2020-Nov. 2020). These
datasets include detention statistics about individuals arrested by
ICE in the interior of the country, as well as by CBP at or near the
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Factors Contributing to the Spread of
COVID-19 in Immigration Detention
Several factors have contributed to the rapid spread of COVID-19
in immigration detention. First, ICE delayed testing detained
noncitizens for COVID-19. Second, ICE delayed issuing COVID19 guidance to all immigration detention facilities and made
important infection prevention and control measures
discretionary rather than mandatory. In particular, too much
discretion has been permitted regarding quarantine methods and
transfers of detainees between facilities. Third, ICE lacked a
system for tracking medically vulnerable detainees at risk for
serious illness from COVID-19. Each of these factors is
discussed below.

Delayed Testing
There were signiﬁcant delays in testing detained noncitizens for
COVID-19 that allowed infections to spread rapidly at the
beginning of the pandemic. While ICE has not shared
information about when it began testing for COVID-19, it
began reporting data on COVID-19 testing on its website on
April 28, 2020, well into the pandemic. On that day, it reported
that only 705 detainees had been tested, of whom 425 were
conﬁrmed positive. By the end of May 2020, only 2781 detainees
had been tested, of whom 1406 were positive. The extremely high
positive rate of 50.5% in the month of May underscored the need
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FIGURE 1 | COVID-19 Testing of Immigration Detainees, April-November 2020. Source: COVID-19 ICE Detainee Statistics, available at “https://www.ice.gov/
coronavirus” and archived versions of that webpage.

for more widespread testing. Over the next several months, ICE
began testing around 10,000 detainees each month. By December
2, 2020, ICE had tested 67,660 detainees, of whom 7,567 (11.2%)
were conﬁrmed positive. Figure 1 shows how COVID-19 testing
of detainees progressed between April and November 2000.

stressed that noncitizens who pose a potential danger to
persons or property should not be released as a matter of
discretion, giving Field Ofﬁce Directors wide latitude to deem
someone a potential danger and keep them detained.
ICE ﬁnally set forth certain mandatory requirements for all
facilities holding immigration detainees on April 10, 2020, when
it issued the ﬁrst version of the PRR (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020f). Among other things, the PRR directed all
facilities to require staff and detainees to wear cloth face coverings
when PPE is limited and to provide unlimited supplies of liquid
soap for handwashing. However, the PRR, like prior guidance,
was replete with discretionary language.
For example, the PRR stated that “efforts should be made” to
reduce the population to approximately 75% of capacity, instead
of requiring ICE to reduce the detained population. With respect
to social distancing, the PRR simply noted that “strict social
distancing may not be possible” and suggested that certain
measures be adopted “to the extent practicable” (Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, 2020f). Regarding new entrants to a
facility, ICE advised making “considerable effort” to quarantine
them for 14 days before they enter the general population
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020f). For
symptomatic detainees, the PRR stated that “ideally” they
should not be isolated with other individuals (Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, 2020f). This discretionary language
enabled detention centers to avoid adopting crucial measures for
preventing the spread of COVID-19.
The PRR has been revised multiple times during the course of
the pandemic, generally in response to updated guidance from
CDC or federal court orders requiring ICE to make certain
changes. At the time of this writing, the most recent version
of the PRR is the ﬁfth version that was published on October 27,
2020. Two especially important areas where discretionary
measure remain a concern involve quarantining cohorts of
detainees and transfers between facilities.

Delayed and Discretionary Guidance
From ICE
Another major factor contributing to the spread of COVID-19 in
detention was delayed and discretionary guidance from ICE. ICE
did not issue COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements
(“PRR”) that apply to all immigration detention facilities until
April 10, 2020, one month into the pandemic (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 2020f). Before April 10, 2020, ICE issued
various memoranda that provided only piecemeal instructions
and did not apply to all detention facilities.
The ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) ﬁrst issued guidance on
March 6, 2020, informing health care staff of the CDC’s
recommendations for testing but leaving it up to staff to use
their own discretion in deciding whether someone should be
tested (Immigration and Customs Enforcement Health Service
Corps, 2020). The IHSC guidance did not stress the importance of
social distancing or face masks. A few weeks later, on March 27,
2020, ICE issued a memorandum that set forth an “action plan”
with certain measures designed to reduce exposure to COVID-19,
such as screening staff and detainees, suspending social visitation,
and offering non-contact legal visits (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020c). However, this action plan applied only to
“ICE-dedicated facilities,” meaning facilities that hold exclusively
immigration detainees. With respect to the 172 “non-dedicated
facilities,” which hold federal or state criminal detainees as well as
civil immigration detainees, ICE deferred to local, state, and
federal public health authorities.
Shortly thereafter, on April 4, 2020, ICE issued updated
guidance titled “Detained Docked Review,” asking Field Ofﬁce
Directors to “please” review the custody of individuals who have a
“signiﬁcant discretionary factor weighing in favor of release”
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020d). This
language did not require compliance. The guidance also
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Quarantining Practices
“Cohorting” refers to isolating a group of potentially exposed
individuals together. According to the CDC, every possible effort
should be made to individually quarantine potentially exposed
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people. The CDC explains that “cohorting individuals with
suspected COVID-19 is not recommended due to the high risk
of transmission from infected to uninfected individuals” (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Thus, “cohorting
should only be practiced if there are no other available
options.” ICE, however, has relied primarily on cohorting
potentially exposed individuals (Schriro, 2020). Entire dorms,
which may include 50 or more people, are typically placed in
isolation as a cohort when there is suspected exposure. The PRR
simply instructs detention facility operators to “review” the
CDC’s preferred methods of isolation and allows decisions to
be made “depending on the space available in a particular
facility.” Additionally, the CDC recommends that when it is
not possible to place individuals who are quarantined in single
cells, each person in the cohort should be assigned at least 6 feet of
personal space in all directions (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2020). Such social distancing simply is not possible in
a detention facility.

who are not subject to mandatory detention. The RCA includes
a “checklist” for “special vulnerabilities,” but this checklist
provides only minimal information. It includes only four
categories that can be marked: “serious physical illness,”
“elderly,” “disabled,” and “pregnant.” These limited
categories failed to provide enough information to identify
individuals at high risk of severe illness due to COVID-19.
The absence of a centralized tracking mechanism for high risk
individuals resulted in insufﬁcient medical and preventive
monitoring.

Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration
Detention and Detained Proceedings
The spread of COVID-19 in immigration detention has had an
enormous impact on detention. Both the number of people in
detention and the average length of detention have changed as a
result of the pandemic. Additionally, detained removal
proceedings have been adversely impacted, especially access to
counsel.

Transfers Between Detention Facilities
The CDC recommends against transferring detained individuals
between facilities unless absolutely necessary. Yet, throughout the
pandemic, ICE has continued to transfer detained noncitizens all
over the nation. Such transfers have led to known outbreaks of
COVID-19 in numerous states, including Texas, Ohio, Florida,
Mississippi, and Louisiana (Seville and Rappleye, 2020). For
instance, on April 11, 2020, ICE transferred around 70 people
from facilities in Philadelphia and New Jersey with known
outbreaks of COVID-19 to the Prairieland Detention Center
in Alvarado, Texas, resulting in an outbreak there (Solis,
2020). Furthermore, at least 200 people were transferred to the
Bluebonnet Detention Center in Texas between mid-March 2020
and the end of May 2020 (Seville and Rappleye, 2020). By early
April 2020, there was an outbreak in Bluebonnet that grew to 300
conﬁrmed cases (Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2020b).
In a particularly egregious incident, ICE ﬂew detainees to
Virginia simply to transport its own agents to Washington DC to
help suppress Black Lives Matter protests (Olivo and Miroff,
2020). That transfer resulted in an outbreak of 300 COVID-19
cases in the Farmville Detention Center, resulting in one death.
While the ﬁfth version of the PRR attempts to limit transfers, the
number of exceptions still makes it ineffective, as discussed
further in Part III below.

Reduction in Detained Population
Since the pandemic began, the average daily detained population
has been reduced by more than half. In February 2020, before the
WHO declared a pandemic, the average daily detained
population was 39,314 (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020b). By November 2020, it was down to
16,894 (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020e). The
total drop in detention can be attributed to both fewer arrests by
ICE, which operates in the interior of the country, and fewer
arrests by CBP, which operates at the nation’s borders. However,
the drop in detention due to fewer arrests by CBP has been much
more pronounced, as shown in Figure 2 (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 2020b; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020e).
In March 2020, ICE announced that it would make only
“mission critical” arrests necessary to “maintain public safety
and national security” (Kullgren, 2020; Sacchetti and Hernández,
2020). The average daily detained population attributed to arrests
by ICE dropped from 18,981 in February 2020 to 11,534 by
November 2020 (Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2020e). By comparison, the average daily detained population
attributed to arrests by CBP fell from 20,332 in February 2020 to
just 5,451 by November 2020 (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020b; Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2020e).
The more dramatic drop in detention by CBP is related to
CBP’s use of Title 42 of the United States Code, a public health
law, to expel migrants, including asylum seekers, at the southwest
border on public health grounds, rather than allowing them to
apply for asylum in the United States. On March 21, 2020,
President Trump determined that it was necessary to prevent
undocumented migrants from entering the United States in the
interest of public health and prohibited their entry under Title 42.
That month, CBP expelled 7,075 migrants at the southwest
border (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2020a). The
number of expulsions has continued to increase exponentially

NO SYSTEM FOR TRACKING MEDICALLY
VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS IN
DETENTION
A third factor that contributed to the spread of COVID-19,
recognized by the April 20, 2020, court order in Fraihat v.
United States. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is that no
system existed for identifying and tracking medically vulnerable
detainees (Fraihat, 2020). ICE uses a tool called a Risk
Classiﬁcation
Assessment
(RCA)
that
generates
recommendations about detention or release for individuals

Frontiers in Human Dynamics | www.frontiersin.org

4

April 2021 | Volume 2 | Article 599222

Marouf

Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration Detention

FIGURE 2 | Average daily population in immigration detention by arresting authority, January-November 2020. Source: Ice detention data, FY20 YTD; ice detention
data, FY 21 YTD.

each month, exceeding 59,000 at the southwest border by October
2020 (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2020b).
As expulsions under Title 42 have increased, the number of
individuals apprehended by CBP under Title 8 has plummeted
(Figure 3). Title 8 pertains to immigration proceedings and
protects the right to apply for asylum. The drop in credible
fear interviews conducted by asylum ofﬁcers for individuals
apprehended at or near the border further conﬁrms that
asylum seekers are among those being expelled at the border.
Credible fear interviews provide a threshold screening for asylum,
and those who pass the interview are allowed to apply for asylum
in immigration court. The number of credible fear cases received
by USCIS dropped from 4,631 in February 2020 to 709 in October
2020 (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2020).
A small percentage of the reduction in the detained population
can also be attributed to the release of children detained in “family
residential centers” (FRCs), which are detention centers that hold
children together with their parents. Based on a nationwide
restraining order issued by a federal judge in Flores v. Barr in
March 2020, ICE was required to release children detained in FRCs
(Flores, 2020). The average daily detained population in FRCs
dropped from 1,591 in March 2020 to 766 in April 2020 and
continued to decline in the following months (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 2020b). By November 2020, the average
daily detained population in FRCs was 235 (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 2020e). The parents of the children,
however, were not ordered released, and therefore had to decide
whether to be separated from their children or remain together
with their children in detention (Alvarez and Sands, 2020).

2020, that number had increased to 88 days (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 2020e). For individuals arrested by CBP,
generally asylum seekers who asked for asylum at a port of entry
or who were apprehended near the border after entering unlawfully,
the average length in detention increased from 54 days in March to
137 days in November (Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2020b; Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020e). This could
be due to delays in conducting credible fears interviews or in delays
conducting immigration court hearings to review credible fear denials.
Additionally, the increase in the average length of detention
may be due to court closures or delayed bond hearings. There
may also be more requests for continuances related to the
pandemic. Noncitizens may need more time to ﬁnd an
attorney, and attorneys may need more time to prepare cases
when they cannot meet with clients in person. In cases where the
noncitizen already has ﬁnal order of removal, detention may be
prolonged by border closures, lack of commercial ﬂights, and
fewer charter ﬂights to effectuate a deportation or voluntary
departure.

IMPACT ON REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
The pandemic has also had a signiﬁcant impact on removal
proceedings. Non-detained hearings in immigration court have
been indeﬁnitely postponed. Cases subject to the Migrant
Protection Protocols (“MPP”) have also been indeﬁnitely
postponed, even though those cases are categorized as
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1,225(b) (2). Asylum seekers placed
in MPP are forced to remain in Mexico during their removal
proceedings and must present themselves at designated ports of
entry to be transported by ICE to their court hearings
(Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement,
2019a).
Consequently, they are effectively trapped in dangerous areas
and squalid camps along the border. Even though they are not in

Prolonged Detention
While the size of the detained population has decreased during the
pandemic, the length of detention has increased. In March 2020, the
average length of stay in immigration detention was 51 days
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020b). By November
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FIGURE 3 | Public health expulsions and immigration apprehensions by CBP, March to October 2020. Sources: CBP, nationwide enforcement encounters: Title 8.

a detention center, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d) states that
they are “considered detained,” and immigration courts normally
place MPP cases on the detained docket. Nevertheless, MPP cases
remain suspended during the pandemic, prolonging and
exacerbating the risk of harm these asylum seekers face while
forced to remain in Mexico.
With the exception of MPP cases, immigration courts have
proceeded with the detained docket during the pandemic. In
order to reduce the need for personal appearances, immigration
courts have liberally allowed telephonic appearances by counsel
for master hearings, which are brief, status hearings. However, inperson appearances remain the norm for merits hearings, which
are similar to trials. As a result, immigration judges, court
personnel, attorneys on both sides, and detained immigrants
face a risk of being infected by COVID-19 in court. This risk
is real, as evidenced by numerous court closures due to COVID19 exposure. But postponing detained cases due to the pandemic
would further prolong detention and potentially raise due process
concerns.
In moving forward with detained cases, both detained
individuals and representatives have faced numerous
challenges. For detained individuals, it is harder to ﬁnd a
representative and to communicate with an existing
representative. Representatives have also dealt with confusing
and changing directives about how to communicate with clients
during the course of the pandemic. At the very beginning of the
pandemic, guidance on ICE’s website instructed legal
representatives to bring their own PPE to detention centers to
have contact visits. That guidance was later changed to say that
representatives are required to undergo “the same screening
required for staff,” without specifying what that screening
involves. As COVID-19 spread, it became increasingly
dangerous for representatives to visit in person even if they
brought their own PPE. Attorneys were forced to balance their
professional responsibility of zealous representation with serious
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threats to their personal health. Ultimately, most representatives
began to rely exclusively on phone calls to continue representing
detained clients.
However, legal calls have also been challenging. Many
detention centers do not have an adequate number of phones
dedicated to legal calls. Detained individuals may therefore be
forced to call their counsel from non-legal phone lines, which
deprive them of private and conﬁdential communications. While
some detention centers make video conference calls available to
detainees, those also can be monitored. Additionally, in some
detention centers, individuals who are quarantined have been cut
off completely from access to the legal phones, leaving them no
choice but to make calls on monitored lines. Making matters
worse, there are often tight time limits on calls and detainees may
not be able to pay for them.
For counsel, being limited to telephonic communications with
a client can greatly impede the representation. It is difﬁcult to
establish trust and properly prepare a client to testify
telephonically. Assessing the client’s demeanor and reviewing
evidence are also nearly impossible over the phone. From a
detained individual’s perspective, it is much harder to engage
with the legal process when interactions occur remotely rather
than in-person, which can lead to giving up the case instead of
ﬁghting to remain in the country (Eagly, 2015). Detained
individuals also lose the ability to confer with counsel before,
during, and after a hearing, further limiting access to counsel.
Consequently, protecting access to counsel, which is crucial to
fundamental due process, remains one of the most challenges
issues during the pandemic.

Addressing COVID-19 Related Problems in
Detention
In light of the problems discussed above, urgent reforms are
needed. This section makes several recommendations to improve
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the plight of detained noncitizens. First and foremost, release is
the best way to protect both public health and legal rights. There
are various ways that ICE can release noncitizens to minimize any
concerns about ﬂight risk. Second, transfers between facilities
should be stopped, or at least sharply curtailed and better
regulated. Third, ICE should create a long-term system for
tracking medically vulnerable detainees. Fourth, courts should
prioritize bond hearings and habeas petitions challenging
detention. Finally, detained noncitizens should be prioritized
for COVID-19 vaccination.

and Customs Enforcement, 2019b; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020b). Electronic monitoring programs involve
either an ankle bracelet with GPS monitoring, telephonic checkins with voice recognition software, or a smartphone app called
SMARTLink that uses a photo check-in. If ﬂight risk is the main
issue, then bond and electronic monitoring are both preferable
alternatives to detention that address that concern.
Community-based alternatives to detention that rely on case
management are an even better option (Marouf, 2017). These
community-based alternatives were being piloted during the
Obama Administration. The basic idea is to provide a case
manager’s support with legal, medical, and other needs in
order to help noncitizens effectively navigate their removal
proceedings and comply with court orders. Reducing detention
long-term is not only the most humane option, but it will also
save enormous costs while protecting public health. As Solis et al.
have concluded, simply “implementing CDC recommendations
to mitigate COVID-19 transmission in carceral settings has been
insufﬁcient to lessen outbreak progression” (Solis et al., 2020).

Release From Detention
Releasing noncitizens from detention is the best way to address
the risk of transmission in detention, concerns with medical care
in detention, and the impact of detention on removal proceedings
(Meyer et al., 2020; Solis et al., 2020). A poll by the University of
Colorado Immigration Clinic found that a majority of the
population supports releasing noncitizens from detention
during the pandemic (Chapin, 2020). Releasing noncitizens
not only lowers the risk of infection by reducing the detained
population, but it also addresses some of the problems that ICE is
currently addressing through dangerous transfers. For example,
instead of transferring noncitizens for medical evaluation or
clinical care, they could be released for medical care in the
community; and instead of transferring noncitizens to
“prevent overcrowding,” that issue can be resolved by releasing
more people from detention.
One positive change during the past year is that ICE has
increased its use of “parole” under 8 C.F.R. § 212(d) (5) as a way
to release someone from detention for humanitarian reasons. In
FY 2019, 17,798 noncitizens were released on parole out of a total
of 263,263 noncitizens released from detention (6.8%), while in
FY 2020, 11,140 noncitizens were released on parole out of 60,625
released from detention (18.4%) (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2019b; Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2020b). But the parole authority could be used much more
liberally to reduce the detained population. In particular,
noncitizens who have lawfully asked for asylum at a port of
entry are generally detained as “arriving aliens,” but ICE can
decide to release them through parole. Releasing all asylum
seekers would uphold the right to seek asylum while also
protecting public health.
ICE could also release more noncitizens on their own
recognizance, under an order of supervision, or on bond. In
FY 2020, a much smaller percent of noncitizens were released
from detention on their own recognizance compared to FY 2019
(23% compared to 67%), while a higher percentage of noncitizens
were released under an order of supervision in FY 2020 compared
to FY 2019 (10.6% compared to 5.2%). One might expect ICE to
be more willing to set bonds during the pandemic, but the percent
of people released from detention based on a bond set by ICE did
not change in FY 2020 compared to FY 2019 (7.6% compared to
7.5%). More frequent use of these alternatives would help keep
detention as a last resort.
The total number of people enrolled in ICE’s electronic
monitoring programs also did not increase much in FY 2020
compared to FY 2019 (85,857 compared 83,186) (Immigration
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Stopping Transfers Between Facilities
Abolishing detention is ideal, but at a minimum transfers should
be sharply curtailed and better regulated. Although the ﬁfth
version of the PRR attempts to limit transfers, the exceptions
swallow the general rule (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 2020g). The PRR states that transfers “are
discontinued unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical
isolation/quarantine, clinical care, extenuating security concerns,
release or removal, or to prevent overcrowding” (Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, 2020g). Because “security concerns”
are not deﬁned, this particular exception could be invoked for
unspeciﬁed reasons. Additionally, the PRR allows “transfers for
any other reason,” as long as there is “justiﬁcation and preapproval from the local [ICE] Field Ofﬁce Director”
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020g). The PRR
does not explain what qualiﬁes as a justiﬁcation. This loophole
gives broad discretion to ICE Field Ofﬁce Directors to approve
transfers. Consequently, transfers are continuing on a large scale,
both within states and between states.
Stopping these transfers, or at least substantially reducing
them by reigning in the exceptions, is crucial for curbing the
spread of COVID-19. Transfers for “clinical care” and “medical
isolation/quarantine” are especially disturbing because the
individuals being transferred may already be infected. If a
facility cannot provide the medical evaluation or clinical care
needed, the appropriate response during a pandemic would be to
take the individual to an outside medical provider or release the
individual, rather than transferring the individual to another
detention facility. Release is also a much better solution than
transfers to prevent overcrowding. Allowing transfers to “prevent
overcrowding” effectively permits pre-pandemic practices to
continue, since ICE has typically made decisions about
transfers based on bed space (Ryo and Peacock, 2018).
Apart from the public health reasons for stopping transfers,
they should be stopped because of their harmful impact on
removal proceedings. As Emily Ryo and Ian Peacock have
explained, transfers can “hinder access to legal representation,
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sever family ties and community support, and separate detainees
from the evidence needed in their court proceedings” (Ryo and
Peacock, 2018). Human Rights Watch reports that transfers are
often made to facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,
“states that collectively have the worst ratio of transferred
immigrant detainees to immigration attorneys in the country
(510–1) (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Given how the pandemic
has already hindered access to representatives, family, and
community support, adding transfers to this mix makes
representation nearly untenable. Transfers also impede
detainees’ ability to challenge their detention through bond
hearings and habeas petitions, which is especially problematic
during the pandemic (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Even if transfers cannot be completely stopped, more checks
should be imposed on the decisions of ICE ofﬁcers to transfer
detainees. Transfers of state and federal prisoners are currently
much better regulated than the transfer of immigration detainees.
If ever there was a time to address the need for better regulation of
transfers, it is now, during a pandemic.

research indicates that bond proceedings often are not fair, as the
recency and number of convictions are not predictive of danger
determinations, Central Americans are more likely to be deemed
dangerous, and pro se individuals fare worse than those with
representation even after controlling for criminal history (Ryo,
2019c). For detainees who cannot afford a bond, immigration
judges should seriously consider other alternatives to detention.
Considering the pandemic a “changed circumstance” that justiﬁes
a new bond hearing if bond was previously denied would also
help protect public health.
Similarly, federal district courts should prioritize habeas
petition by noncitizens seeking release from detention. It is all
too common for federal judges to handle habeas petitions without
any urgency, even during the pandemic. Instead of giving the
government sixty days to respond to a habeas petition and then
waiting thirty more days for a reply, courts should set expedited
brieﬁng schedules. Once the brieﬁng is completed, courts should
promptly schedule a hearing or render a decision. For many
detained noncitizens, a habeas petition challenging prolonged
detention or the conditions of detention may be the only hope for
release.

Creating a System for Tracking Medically Vulnerable
Detainees Long Term
ICE eventually created a tracking mechanism in response to a
preliminary injunction issued by a federal court in a case called
Fraihat. The ﬁfth version of the PRR explains that two categories
of detained individuals must be tracked based on the Fraihat class
action (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020g). One
category is for detained individuals who are pregnant or aged 55
and older. This category is called “Subclass One” and assigned the
alert code “RF1.” The second category is for detained individuals
with certain medical conditions, who are called “Subclass Two”
and assigned the alert code “RF2.”
This new tracking system promotes compliance with the
court’s orders in Fraihat, but it is speciﬁc to the subclasses
deﬁned in that litigation. ICE could simply terminate the
tracking system if the court no longer required it. A tracking
method that is independent of the litigation and captures
different types of medical vulnerabilities would be useful to
maintain not only for the present pandemic, but long term. It
would be useful for any future pandemics as well as to improve
medical treatment in detention by providing a way for ICE to
assess the medical conditions and needs of the detained
population.

Prioritizing Detained Noncitizens for COVID-19
Vaccination
Finally, while noncitizens remain detained, they should be
prioritized for vaccination as a highly vulnerable group. The
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), a
federal advisory committee that develops recommendations on
the use of vaccines, has recommended, as interim guidance, that
health care personnel and residents of long-term care facilities be
offered COVID-19 vaccine in the initial phase of the vaccination
program (Dooling et al., 2020). However, the ethical principles
that guide decisionmaking about vaccination if supply is limited
support prioritizing detained noncitizens as well. These ethical
principles include: 1) maximizing beneﬁts and minimizing
harms; 2) mitigating health inequities; 3) promoting justice;
and 4) promoting transparency.
Vaccinating detained noncitizens helps maximize beneﬁts in
several ways. It reduces the risk of large outbreaks in detention
facilities; reduces the risk of spreading the disease to
surrounding communities as well as to other cities and states
through transfers; and reduces the risk of spreading the disease
to other countries through deportations. At the same time,
vaccinating detainees helps minimize harms, not only to the
detainees themselves, but to the population. In fact, Jamie Solis
et al. have identiﬁed outbreaks in jails, prisons, and immigration
detention centers as responsible for the third wave of structural
vulnerability related to COVID-19 that began in April 2020
(Solis et al., 2020). As WHO has explained, the transmission of
COVID-19 in detention centers ampliﬁes the overall effect of
the pandemic (World Health Organization Regional Ofﬁce for
Europe, 2020). According to the WHO, “efforts to control
COVID-19 in the community are likely to fail if strong
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, adequate
testing, treatment and care are not carried out in prisons and
other places of detention” (World Health Organization Regional
Ofﬁce for Europe, 2020).

Prioritizing Bond Hearings and Habeas Petitions
Courts also have an important role to play in helping medically
vulnerable noncitizens in detention. Immigration Judges should
prioritize bond hearings in order to facilitate release from
detention. During bond hearings, judges should ensure that
the burden of proof is placed on the government to show a
need for detention based on ﬂight risk or danger. David Hausman
has argued that because detention itself poses a danger to the
community, immigration courts actually should not even
consider ﬂight risk (Hausman, 2020). Immigration judges
should further ensure that they are setting individualized
bonds based on ability to pay, instead of blanket bonds, and
that they fairly consider all relevant factors. Emily Ryo’s empirical
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Additionally, vaccinating detained noncitizens would help
mitigate health inequities in the burden of COVID-19 disease.
Factors such as income, access to health care, and race/ethnicity,
which contribute to health disparities, are traditionally
considered in applying this ethical principle. Most detained
noncitizens are black or brown, have little or no income,
limited access to health care, and no ability to socially distance
in detention. Blacks and Hispanics also have a high prevalence of
underlying medical conditions that place them at high risk of
progressing to severe COVID-19 and dying (Solis et al., 2020).
Prioritizing the vaccination of detained noncitizens would ensure
that they are not further disadvantaged.
Third, the principle of promoting justice requires upholding
the dignity of all persons and removing barriers to vaccination
among marginalized groups. Detained noncitizens have already
been stripped of their dignity in numerous ways and are often
invisible to society, hidden in detention centers in remote areas.
Certain subgroups of detained noncitizens are even less visible
and more marginalized because they speak neither English nor
Spanish and face medical neglect due to language barriers (Ryo,
2019b). The principle of promoting justice requires intentionally
ensuring that all detained noncitizens “have equal opportunity to
be vaccinated, both within the groups recommended for initial
vaccination, and as vaccine becomes more widely available”
(McClung et al., 2020). Establishing a fair and consistent
implementation process is also an important aspect of this
principle. The government should therefore not only prioritize
the vaccination of detained noncitizens, but also have a concrete
plan in place for how the vaccine will be distributed to this
vulnerable group.
Finally, the principle of transparency supports prioritizing the
vaccination of detained noncitizens because ICE’s treatment of
this group is notoriously non-transparent. Privately operated
detention centers, which hold the vast majority of detained
noncitizens (Cullen, 2018), are especially lacking in

transparency and accountability (Ryo and Peacock, 2018). For
those in detention, the experience of incarceration itself further
reduces trust in government (Weaver and Lerman, 2010; Muller
and Schrage, 2014). At a minimum, in order to promote
transparency, the government’s plan for distributing a
vaccinate to detained noncitizens should be made publicly
available. ICE should also provide accurate and detailed data
on administration of the vaccine on its website.

CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted all aspects of
immigration detention in the United States, from the
conditions and length of detention, to the size of the detained
population, to how detained removal proceedings are conducted.
Using detention only as a last resort and relying more on
alternatives would mitigate both the health risks of COVID-19
and its impact on the legal rights of detained individuals.
Stopping transfers between detention facilities, establishing a
system to track medically vulnerable detainees long-term,
prioritizing bond hearings and habeas petitions by noncitizens
seeking release, and prioritizing detained noncitizens for
vaccinations are all ways to mitigate these harms.
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